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Introduction
This paper has three aims: first, we present a formal recipe that Frege
followed in his magnum opus Grundgesetze der Arithmetik1 when formulating
definitions. This generalized recipe, as we will call it, is not explicitly
mentioned as such by Frege, but we will offer strong reasons to believe that
Frege applied the recipe in developing the formal material of Grundgesetze.
Second, we will show that a version of Basic Law V plays a fundamental role
in the generalized recipe. We will explicate exactly what this role is and how it
differs from the role played by extensions in Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik.2
Third, and finally, we will demonstrate that this hitherto neglected yet
foundational aspect of Frege’s use of Basic Law V helps to resolve a number
of important interpretative challenges in recent Frege scholarship, while also
shedding light on some important differences between Frege’s logicism and
recent ‘neo-logicist’ approaches to the foundations of mathematics.
The structure of our paper is as follows: In the first section, we will
outline Frege’s semi-formal definition of cardinal numbers given in Grundlagen
and present what we call the simple recipe. In the second section, we will
outline two distinct ways to unpack the simple recipe formally, followed
by a discussion of its philosophical and technical shortcomings. This leads
naturally to the topic of the third section—the problem of the singleton—a
problem that Frege was aware of and which, we believe, significantly shaped
his views on definitions between Grundlagen and Grundgesetze. These
observations motivate the introduction of the generalized recipe. In the
1Published in two volumes: (Frege, 1893) and (Frege, 1903), henceforth: Grundgesetze.
2(Frege, 1884), henceforth: Grundlagen.
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fourth section, we will explain this generalized modification of the simple
recipe and demonstrate how it is applied in arriving at the majority of the
definitions given in Grundgesetze. In the fifth section, we will argue that
the generalized recipe has important philosophical consequences for Frege
scholarship: we will sketch the beginnings of a new interpretation of the role
and importance of Basic Law V and of Hume’s Principle in Frege’s mature
(Grundgesetze-era) philosophy of mathematics. We close by noting some
differences between Frege’s project and the methodology of contemporary
neo-logicism.
1 Identifying abstracts in Grundlagen
As is well known, in Grundlagen Frege rejected Hume’s Principle:3
HP : (∀X)(∀Y )[”(X) = ”(Y )↔ X ≈ Y ]
as a definition of the concept cardinal number.4 Hume’s Principle states
that the number of F ’s is identical to the number of G’s if and only if the
F ’s and the G’s are in one-to-one correspondence. Frege was very likely
aware of the fact that Hume’s Principle on its own (plus straightforward
definitions of arithmetical concepts such as successor, addition, and
multiplication) entails what we now call the second-order Dedekind-Peano
axioms for arithmetic—a result that is known as Frege’s Theorem.5 The
reason for his rejection of Hume’s Principle as a proper definition is known
as the Caesar Problem:
... we can never—to take a crude example—decide by means of
our definitions whether a concept has the number Julius Caesar
3Frege never used the expression “Hume’s Principle”. The use of this label is, however,
entrenched amongst Frege scholars and so we will refer to this principle throughout using
“Hume’s Principle”, even in a context when we discuss Frege’s views about it.
4“”” is the cardinal-number operator, and “X ≈ Y ” abbreviates the second-order
formula stating that there is a one-to-one onto function from X to Y . We shall partly
translate Frege’s Grundgesetze formulations into modern terminology—with appropriate
comments regarding any theoretical mutilations that might result—but we will retain
his original notation in quotations. Hence, we will use modern ‘Australian’ A’s (∀) and
‘backwards’ E’s (∃) for the quantifiers, and modern linear notation (→) for the material
conditional. The reader should be aware that identity (=) and equivalence (↔) are, within
Frege’s Grundgesetze formalism, equivalent when the arguments are sentences (i.e. names
of truth-values), and we will use whichever is more illuminating in our own formulations
below.
5The label “Frege’s Theorem” dates back to (Boolos, 1990). See also (Heck, 2011),
chapter 1, p. 3ff on the historical context surrounding Frege’s Theorem. (Dummett, 1991),
p. 123 suggests that Frege was aware that Peano Arithmetic could be derived solely from
Hume’s Principle at the time of writing Grundlagen. However, as pointed out in (Boolos
and Heck, 1998), Frege’s sketch of this result—in particular, the proof sketch of the
successor axiom—in Grundlagen is incorrect. Compare also (Heck, 2011), chapter 3.
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belonging to it, whether this famous conqueror of Gaul is a
number or not.
(Frege, 1884), §56, p. 68.
The worry, in short, is that an adequate definition of the concept cardinal
number should settle all identities involving numerical terms, including
those where the identity symbol “=” is flanked by a Fregean numeral (such
as “”(F )”) on one side and a non-numerical term (such as “Julius Caesar”)
on the other. Hume’s Principle does not settle such identities and thus it is
inadequate as a definition of the concept cardinal number.
Frege’s proposed solution to the Caesar Problem is simple to state: in
order to distinguish numbers from more ‘pedestrian’ objects, such as the
conqueror of Gaul, Frege proposes that we identify cardinal numbers with
certain extensions by means of an explicit definition. In Grundlagen, §68,
immediately after a discussion of the Caesar Problem, Frege offers the
following definition:
Accordingly, I define:
the cardinal number which belongs to the concept F is the ex-
tension of the concept “equinumerous to the concept F”.
(Frege, 1884), §68, p. 79-80.
Thus, cardinal numbers are a particular kind of extension. It is clear from
his discussion in Grundlagen, however, that it is not just cardinal numbers
but many (if not all) other mathematical objects that are to be identified
with appropriate extensions. In the same section, he writes:
the direction of line a is the extension of the concept “parallel to
line a”
the shape of triangle t is the extension of the concept “similar to
the triangle t”.
(Frege, 1884), §68, p. 79.
The wide-ranging nature of these examples strongly suggests that Frege
regarded this approach not merely as a technical fix to resolve particular
cases involving Caesar-type examples, but rather as a codification of a
basic insight into the nature of mathematical objects and mathematical
concepts. Frege’s identification of mathematical objects with the extension
of corresponding equivalence classes amounts to a definitional method which
seems generally applicable to all mathematical objects and concepts, including
shapes, directions, and cardinal numbers.6 Hence, from this perspective
6There is, of course, Grundlagen §107, where Frege suggests that he attaches no
particular importance to his use of the term “extensions of concepts”. By the time of
Grundgesetze, however, Frege attaches a great deal of importance to extensions of concepts,
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there is nothing special about cardinal numbers—they are just a particularly
salient example of the definitional methodology applied in Grundlagen.7
Reflecting on Frege’s methodology in Grundlagen, we obtain the following
recipe for identifying the mathematical objects falling under some mathe-
matical concept C (such as direction or shape), which we shall call the
simple abstracta-as-extension recipe, or simply, the simple recipe:8
Step 1: Identify the underlying concept ΦC such that C’s are
C’s of ΦC ’s.
That is, if C is the concept direction, then ΦC is the concept line, and if
C is the concept shape, then ΦC is the concept triangle.
Step 2: Formulate the identity conditions for C’s in terms of
some appropriate equivalence relation ΨC on the underlying
domain of ΦC ’s.
That is, identify a formula of the form:
∀φ1, φ2 ∈ ΦC , the C of φ1 = the C of φ2 ↔ ΨC(φ1, φ2)
where ΨC provides the identity conditions for C’s. Thus, if C is the concept
direction, then ΨC is the relation parallelism, and if C is the concept
shape, then ΨC is the relation similarity.
Step 3: Identify the C’s with the equivalence classes of relevant
ΦC ’s (modulo the equivalence relation ΨC).
So, the direction of a line λ is identified with the equivalence class of lines
parallel to λ:
dir(λ) = –ε(ε||λ)
and the shape of a triangle τ is identified with the equivalence class of
triangles similar to τ :
shp(τ) = –ε(ε ∼ τ)
or more generally, value-ranges of functions. This reflects a deep change in Frege’s views
between the time of writing Grundlagen and Grundgesetze, one intimately connected to
his abandoning the simple recipe in favor of the generalized recipe. More on this below.
7There is, of course, something special about cardinal numbers when compared to
shapes and directions: cardinal numbers are defined as extensions of second-level concepts
that hold of concepts (or, alternatively, of first-level concepts that hold of extensions of
concepts). Thus, cardinal numbers, unlike shapes and directions, are logical objects since
they are identified with equivalence classes of logical objects (either concepts or their
extensions), while directions and shapes correspond to equivalence classes of non-logical
objects (lines and geometrical regions respectively).
8Note that Frege does not seem to be giving a general account of the concept geomet-
rical shape, but is instead providing a definition of the narrower concept shape of a
triangle. Having noted this, however, we shall from here on ignore it since it is irrelevant
to our present concerns.
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Step 4: Prove the relevant abstraction principle:
(∀φ1)(∀φ2)[@C(φ1) = @C(φ2)↔ ΦC(φ1, φ2)]
where:
@C(φ) =
–ε(ΨC(ε, φ))
Thus, given our definition identifying directions with equivalence classes of
lines, we prove the adequacy of our definition of direction by proving:
(∀λ1)(∀λ2)[dir(λ1) = dir(λ2)↔ (λ1||λ2)]
that is:
(∀λ1)(∀λ2)[–ε(ε||λ1) = –α(α||λ2)↔ (λ1||λ2)]
and we prove the adequacy of our definition of shape by proving:
(∀τ1)(∀τ2)[shp(τ1) = shp(τ2)↔ (τ1 ∼ τ2)]
that is:
(∀τ1)(∀τ2)[–ε(ε ∼ τ1) = –α(α ∼ τ2)↔ (τ1 ∼ τ2)]
It is important to note that it is Step 3 that provides the definition. Step 4
amounts to proving that the given definition adequately captures the concept
being defined: it functions as an adequacy constraint on the definition.
The examples just discussed are somewhat special since we have here
applied the simple recipe only to first-order abstractions—that is, to defini-
tions of mathematical concepts C where the underlying ΦC ’s are objects and
not second-(or higher-) order concepts, relations, or functions. The reason
for this is that there is an apparent ambiguity in Frege’s application of this
construction to concepts, such as the concept cardinal number, whose
underlying concept ΦC is not objectual. We discuss this in the following
section in more detail.
Another aspect in which the definitions of directions and shapes differ
from the definition of cardinal numbers is that Frege does not explicitly
carry out Step 4 of the simple recipe for directions or shapes, while he does
so for cardinal numbers.9 After providing the definition in §68, and before
sketching the derivation of a version of the Peano axioms in §74-§83, Frege
has this to say:
We will first show that the cardinal number which belongs to the
concept F is equal to the cardinal number which belongs to the
concept G if the concept F is equinumerous to the concept G.
(Frege, 1884), §73, p 85.
9Frege does, however, motivate these definitions of shape and direction by appeal to
their corresponding abstraction principles—see Grundlagen, §68. But unlike the case of
cardinal numbers, he does not derive them.
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After sketching a proof of this claim—essentially, the right-to-left direction of
Hume’s Principle—Frege concludes the section with the following footnote:
And likewise of the converse: If the number which belongs to the
concept F is the same as that which belongs to the concept G,
then the concept F is equal to the concept G.10
(Frege, 1884) §73, p. 86 (fn1).
Strictly speaking, then, Frege does not provide a full proof sketch of Hume’s
Principle in §73 of Grundlagen, but that he considers both directions in one
section we regard as sufficient for our purposes. It is also noteworthy that the
sections in which Frege sketches both a proof of (the two sides of) Hume’s
Principle and proofs of central principles of Peano Arithmetic fall under
the heading “Our definition completed and its worth proved”. Since these
sections contain a derivation sketch of Hume’s Principle first, and then show
how to derive the more familiar arithmetic results from Hume’s Principle, it
seems natural to interpret the derivation of Hume’s Principle as completing
the definition and thus fulfil Step 4 of Frege’s definitional strategy, while
the derivation of the Peano axioms demonstrate the worth of the definition.
To summarise: in Grundlagen Frege provides two sorts of evidence that
the definition of cardinal numbers as extensions is correct. He sketches a
proof that the second-order Peano axioms follow from the definition (a task
carried out with more rigor and in more detail in Grundgesetze). Yet, before
engaging in the proof, he also notes that the definition entails (each direction
of) Hume’s Principle. In short, Frege carries out Step 4 of the simple recipe
when applied to cardinal number and he thus regards Hume’s Principle as
providing a precise adequacy condition that any definition of the concept
cardinal number must meet. This, in turn, explains the central role that
Hume’s Principle plays in Grundlagen despite being rejected as a definition
proper.
10Similarly, in the concluding remarks of Grundlagen, Frege emphasizes the fact that any
adequate definition of number must recapture (i.e. prove) the relevant principle governing
recognition conditions, which in the case of cardinal numbers is Hume’s Principle:
The possibility to correlate single-valuedly in both directions the objects falling
under a concept F with the objects falling under the concept G, was recognised
as the content of a recognition-judgement for numbers. Our definition, therefore,
had to present this possibility as co-referential (gleichbedeutend) with a number-
equation. We here drew on similar cases: the definition of direction based on
parallelism, of shape based on similarity.
(Frege, 1884), §106, p. 115.
After rehearsing the reasons for rejecting Hume’s Principle itself as a definition in §107,
Frege reminds us in §108 of his proof that the explicit definition of cardinal numbers
in terms of extensions meets this criterion—that is, he reminds us of his proof of (the
right-to-left direction of) Hume’s Principle.
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2 Two options for identifying abstracts
In this section, we will outline two ways of unpacking Frege’s identification
of each number with ‘the extension of the concept “equinumerous to the
concept F”’. The first option involves understanding the cardinal number of
F as the extension of the (second-level) concept holding of those concepts
equinumerous to F—that is:
”(F ) = –ε(ε ≈ F )
Note that, on the first option, the extension operator –ε binds a first-level
concept variable, not an object variable.11
The second option involves understanding the cardinal number of F as
the extension of the (first-level) concept holding of the extensions of those
concepts equinumerous to F—that is:
”(F ) = –ε((∃Y )(ε = –α(Y (α)) ∧ Y ≈ F ))
Although this ambiguity is cleared up in the formal treatment of arithmetic
in Grundgesetze, we will consider both proposals suggested by the looser
presentation in Grundlagen. Such an approach will illustrate that, in applying
the recipe the choice between the first option and the second option is not
arbitrary or merely a matter of convenience. Instead, there are principled
reasons for defining cardinal numbers—and, more generally, all second-
order abstracts—as extensions of first-level concepts holding of extensions of
concepts. Thus, there are good reasons for Frege—reasons we believe he was
aware of—to adopt the second option.
2.1 The first option
The first way of understanding Frege’s suggestion that the cardinal number
of the concept F is the extension of the concept equinumerous to the
concept F is to identify the number of F with the extension of the second-
level concept holding of all first-level concepts equinumerous to F :
”(F ) = –ε(ε ≈ F )
If this were the right way to understand Frege, then we can generalise the
simple recipe to higher-level concepts. Given any mathematical concept
11Frege utilizes extensions of concepts within Grundlagen, while mobilizing the more
general notion of value-ranges of functions within Grundgesetze. Extensions of concepts,
however, are a special kind of value-range: they are the value-ranges of unary concepts,
where concepts are functions whose range is the True and the False. Since we shall be
shifting frequently between Frege’s Grundlagen definition of cardinal number and his
Grundgesetze definition of the cardinal number, we shall use the Grundgesetze notation
“–ε(. . . ε . . . )” throughout, taking care to flag when the broader notion of value-range, rather
than extension, is at issue.
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C, with associated underlying (second-level) concept ΦC and (second-level)
equivalence relation ΨC , we can identify the C’s as follows:
@C(F ) =
–ε(ΨC(ε, F ))
where @C is the abstraction operator mapping concepts to C’s.
In particular, applying the first option to extensions themselves provides:
–α(F (α)) = –ε((∀y)(F (y)↔ ε(y)))
This substitution will be admissible if the recipe is not only a means for
identifying ‘new’ objects (or, more carefully: for defining new concepts
by identifying which of the ‘old’ objects—the extensions—fall under those
concepts) but it is, more generally, a method for identifying any mathematical
objects.
There are, we think, good reasons for interpreting the recipe in the
broader sense: the definitional strategy adopted by Frege in Grundlagen is
not merely intended to identify which objects are the cardinal numbers, but
it is intended to play a more general role in Frege’s logicism. In order to
gain epistemological access to some objects falling under a mathematical
concept C, a definition has to provide us with identity conditions for the
objects falling under C. If the recipe achieves this for mathematical objects
falling under a mathematical concept C via an identification of the objects
falling under C with particular extensions (and hence applies to at least
these extensions), then it should apply to all extensions, including those
objects that do not fall under one or another mathematical/logical concept
other than extension itself. Otherwise, the domain of extensions would be
artificially partitioned into two sub-domains corresponding to distinct means
for determining identity conditions: those extensions that fall in the range of
a mathematical concept other than extension to which the recipe applies,
and those that do not.12
For this reason, we think that Frege’s recipe should also apply to exten-
sions themselves.13 In that case, however, the first option reading of the
simple recipe must be rejected as the proper understanding of Frege’s method
for defining mathematical concepts and identifying the corresponding objects.
The reason is simple: The first option is logically incoherent. If we identify
12The point is not that, on the simple recipe, identity conditions for cardinal numbers
are not given in terms of Basic Law V. If cardinal numbers are, in fact, extensions, then
they can be individuated using Basic Law V just like any other extension. The point is
that the philosophically primary identity criterion for cardinal numbers is equinumerosity,
which must then be analyzed in terms of the recipe to reduce it to a relation on relevant
extensions.
13Note that we do not need the (implausible) claim that this reading of the simple recipe
provides us with a definition of extensions, but rather the weaker claim that applying
the simple recipe to value-ranges (which, for Frege, require no definition) results, not in a
definition, but in a truth.
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the extension of a first-level concept with the extension of a second-level
concept, then we need some general means for settling such cross-level iden-
tity statements. According to Basic Law V, however, extensions of concepts
can only be identical when the concepts in question hold of exactly the
same thing or things. No first-level concept can hold of anything that any
second-level concept holds of, since first-level concepts hold of objects and
second-level concepts hold of first-level concepts. As a result (and assuming
that we extend the notion of extension to second-level concepts in the first
place) the only logically possible pair < C1, C2 > where C1 is a first-level
concept, C2 is a second-level concept, and
–ε(C1(ε)) =
–ε(C2(ε)) is the case
where C1 and C2 are both empty concepts (although obviously not the ‘same’
empty concept, since they are of different levels). As a result, the first option
is not a live option. In particular, the identity in question:
–α(F (α)) = –ε((∀y)(F (y)↔ ε(y)))
must, at best, always be false, since the degenerate case where both F
and (∀y)(F (y) ↔ X(y)) hold of nothing whatsoever is not possible here:
(∀y)(F (y)↔ X(y)) holds of F .
Now, once Frege had formulated the logic of Grundgesetze in the required
detail, he would have, no doubt, realised that the first option does not
apply to extensions (or value-ranges for that matter). If, as we argued above,
Frege’s recipe has to apply to all mathematical objects, then the failure of the
first option can now be interpreted in the wider context of motivating a shift
from the first to the second option. Thus, in contrast to other interpreters,
we think that Frege’s adoption of the second option in Grundgesetze is not
merely a choice based on convenience but it is a well-motivated move to fulfil
the requirements of his recipe.14
2.2 The Second Option
The second way of understanding Frege’s suggestion that the number of the
concept F is the extension of the concept equinumerous to the concept
F is to identify the number of F with the extension of the first-level concept
holding of the extensions of all first-level concepts equinumerous to F :
”(F ) = –ε((∃Y )(ε = –α(Y (α)) ∧ Y ≈ F )
In order to simplify our presentation, we will now incorporate one of
Frege’s own tricks: Frege does not define equinumerosity as a second-level
relation holding of pairs of first-level relations, but instead defines it as a
14Consider e.g. (Blanchette, 2012) who interprets Frege’s move from the first to the
second option as “simply [. . . ] one of technical convenience” (p. 83). We pick up on the
issue of arbitrariness in section 4.1. Further discussion of Blanchettes interpretation of
this issue can be found in (Cook, 2015).
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first-level relation holding of the extensions of first-level concepts. Hence,
“α ≈ β” is true if and only if α and β are the extensions of (first-level)
concepts Fα and Fβ such that the Fαs are equinumerous to the Fβs.
15
With this new understanding of “≈” in place, Frege’s definition of cardinal
numbers becomes:
”(F ) = –ε(ε ≈ –α(F (α))
This is, essentially, the definition of number provided by Frege in Grundge-
setze.16
As was the case with the first option, Frege’s application of the second
option version of the simple recipe to the concept cardinal number can
be straightforwardly generalized so as to be applicable to abstracts of any
first-level concepts. Given any mathematical concept C, with associated
underlying (second-level) concept ΦC and (second-level) equivalence relation
ΨC , we can identify the C’s as follows:
@C(F ) =
–ε((∃Y )(ε = §(Y ) ∧ΨC(Y, F )))
where @C is the abstraction operator mapping concepts to C’s. Importantly,
the second option version of the simple recipe does not result in logical
incoherence and it is thus an improvement on the first option.
Nonetheless, the simple recipe does have its limitations: first, the fact
that the second option depends on identifying abstract objects via equiva-
lence relations restricts its applicability to unary abstracts, and hence does
not apply to concepts C where the abstracts falling under C result from
abstracting off more than one of the underlying ΦC ’s—a problem that would,
15Strictly speaking, Frege does not explicitly define equinumerosity in Grundgesetze,
but instead defines a ‘mapping into’ operation. His official definition of number involves
a complicated formula involving a complex subcomponent equivalent to equinumerosity,
constructed in terms of the ‘mapping into’ construct. The lack of an explicit definition
of equinumerosity in Grundgesetze further emphasizes a fact that we will bring out later:
that Hume’s Principle plays no role in the formal development of Grundgesetze.
16There is a difference between the definition of cardinal number that results from
this reading of the simple recipe and the superficially similar formal definition given in
Grundgesetze: Within Grundgesetze Frege’s definition of equinumerosity implies that two
functions F1 and F2 are equinumerous if and only if there is a one-one onto mapping
between the arguments that F1 maps to the True and the arguments that F2 maps to the
True, regardless of whether these functions map all other arguments to the False (that
is, regardless of whether these functions are concepts). Thus, the mature Grundgesetze
definition of cardinal number does not identify numbers with ‘collections’ of extensions of
equinumerous concepts, but rather with ‘collections’ of value-ranges of functions (including
but not restricted to concepts) that map equinumerous collections of objects to the True.
Along similar lines, the ordered pair of α and β, which shall be examined in detail below,
is the ‘collection’ of (the double value-ranges of) all functions that map α and β (in that
order) to the True, and not the (less-inclusive) collection of (value-ranges of) relations
that relate α to β. This observation, while important for other reasons, is orthogonal to
our concerns in this paper, so we ignore it. For further discussion of the issue, see (Cook,
2014).
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of course, also affect the first option. So, for example, the simple recipe will
not provide us with a pairing operation (more on this below).
Second, and more importantly at this stage, the simple recipe gets identity
conditions wrong in specific cases. And here, once again, the problem is to
apply the recipe to extensions. Now, while the second option of applying
the simple recipe does not result in a logical incoherence, we do, however,
face what we call the problem of the singleton. This problem arises when we
apply the second option understanding of the simple recipe to extensions
themselves, obtaining:
–ε(F (ε)) = –α((∃X)(α = –ε(X(ε)) ∧ (∀y)(F (y)↔ X(y)))
This is equivalent (modulo Basic Law V) to:
–ε(F (ε)) = –α(α = –ε(F (ε)))
In short, applying this variant of the simple recipe to extensions themselves
entails (using slightly anachronistic terminology) that every extension is iden-
tical to its singleton. This result, however, is problematic. If we instantiate
the formula above with the empty concept C∅:
–ε(C∅(ε)) =
–α(α = –ε(C∅(ε)))
Basic Law V entails that the empty extension –ε(C∅(ε)) and any singleton
extension are individuated extensionally, hence:
(∀x)(C∅(x)↔ x = –ε(C∅(ε)))
Since the empty concept C∅ holds of no object, we obtain:
(∀x)(x 6= –ε(C∅(ε)))
and hence the contradiction:
–ε(C∅(ε)) 6= –ε(C∅(ε))
It is worth emphasizing that the problem of the singleton does not depend
in any way on the paradoxical character of Basic Law V itself. So long as
we accept that the empty extension exists, that the simple recipe applies to
extensions, and that identity conditions for abstracts are governed by some
abstraction principle that settle the identity of the empty extension and of
singletons in terms of co-extensionality (even if it disagrees with Basic Law
V elsewhere), then the problem will arise.17
17In particular, the problem of the singleton would still be a problem in formal systems
that replace the inconsistent Basic Law V with any of the consistent restricted versions
of it explored in recent neo-logicist literature, such as George Boolos’ NewV in (Boolos,
1989).
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So to summarise: while the second option is, in some way, an improvement
on the first option for identifying abstracts using the simple recipe, it also
fails as a general recipe for providing identity conditions for all mathematical
objects. It fails in its application to extensions themselves and it does not
easily generalise to non-unary abstracts. All this suggests that the simple
recipe itself is in need of some revisions so to be better-suited for the purposes
of Frege’s logicism as defended in Grundgesetze. In section 4, we will show
that the definitions Frege gives in Grundgesetze follow a modified generalized
recipe.
Before outlining the new recipe, however, we should ask whether there
are good reasons for thinking that Frege was aware of the problems affecting
his simple recipe, and whether there are good grounds for thinking that
he rejected it for the reasons we have offered. In the next section, we will
show that Frege was familiar with a version of the problem of the singleton
by the time of Grundgesetze. This, in turn, provides some evidence that
his shift from the simple recipe of Grundlagen to the generalized recipe of
Grundgesetze was quite possibly motivated, in part, by the kinds of concerns
we have discussed above.
3 Frege on singletons
The most straightforward explanation of the problem of the singleton is that
it is brought about by the commitment to identifying extensions and their
singletons—a commitment implicitly codified in the simple recipe. Identifying
objects with their singletons generally is implausible at best.18 Frege himself
was aware of the danger of such an identification and discusses it near the
end of §10 of Grundgesetze, vol. I.
Given that in Grundgesetze sentences are names of truth-values, the logic
of Grundgesetze involves, at a glance, reference to two distinct types of logical
object: truth-values and value-ranges. In order to reduce the number of types
of logical objects—with a view to settling all identities within Grundgesetze
in terms of identity conditions for value-ranges as codified in Basic Law
V—Frege makes two stipulations. First, he stipulates that the reference
of true sentences—the True—is to be identified with the extension of any
concept that holds of exactly the True. In short, the True is identical to the
singleton of the True:
The True = (∀x)(x = x) = –ε(ε = (∀x)(x = x))
Second, he stipulates that the False is identical to the the singleton of the
False:
The False = (∀x)(x 6= x) = –ε(ε = (∀x)(x 6= x))
18This is true even though identifying Urelemente—that is, non-sets—with their single-
tons is often convenient and sometimes desirable.
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He follows up this observation with the following (rather hefty) footnote:
It suggests itself to generalise our stipulation so that every object
is conceived as a value-range, namely, as the extension of a concept
under which it falls as the only object. A concept under which
only the object ∆ falls is ∆ = ξ. We attempt the stipulation: let
–ε(∆ = ε) be the same as ∆. Such a stipulation is possible for
every object that is given to us independently of value-ranges, for
the same reason that we have seen for truth-values. But before
we may generalise this stipulation, the question arises whether it
is not in contradiction with our criterion for recognising value-
ranges if we take an object for ∆ which is already given to us as
a value-range. It is out of the question to allow it to hold only for
such objects which are not given to us as value-ranges, because
the way an object is given must not be regarded as its immutable
property, since the same object can be given in different ways.
Thus, if we insert ‘–αΦ(α)’ for ‘∆’ we obtain
‘–ε(–αΦ(α) = ε) = –αΦ(α)’
and this would be co-referential with
‘ a (–αΦ(α) = a) = Φ(a)’,
which, however, only refers to the True, if Φ(ξ) is a concept under
which only a single object falls, namely –αΦ(α). Since this is not
necessary, our stipulation cannot be upheld in its generality.
The equation ‘–ε(∆ = ε) = ∆’ with which we attempted this
stipulation, is a special case of ‘–εΩ(ε,∆) = ∆’, and one can ask
how the function Ω(ξ, ζ) would have to be constituted, so that
it could generally be specified that ∆ be the same as –εΩ(ε,∆).
Then
–εΩ(ε, –αΦ(α)) = –αΦ(α)
also has to be the True, and thus also
a Ω(a, –αΦ(α)) = Φ(a),
no matter what function Φ(ξ) might be. We shall later be ac-
quainted with a function having this property in ξSζ; however we
shall define it with the aid of the value-range, so that it cannot
be of use for us here.
(Frege, 1893), §10, p. 18.
There are a few things worth noting regarding this passage. First, Frege
is clearly aware that we cannot in general identify extensions with their
singletons, noting that doing so results in identities of the form:
–ε(F (ε)) = –α(α = –ε(F (ε)))
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Such identities can only hold when the concept F holds of exactly one object,
since this formula entails that F holds of exactly –ε(F (ε)). This is, in essence,
the same point made above: we assumed that F held of no objects, and
then derived a contradiction. A similar reductio ad absurdum can of course
be performed if we assume that F holds of more than one object (and we
assume that both the extension of F and singletons are individuated in terms
of co-extensionality).
Crucially, Frege does more than just point out that the identification of
extensions with their singletons fails. In addition, he asks whether there is a
relation R such that:
–ε(F (ε)) = –α(R(α, –ε(F (ε))))
does, in fact, hold generally. As we have already seen, identity is not such a
relation, but it is open—as of §10 of Grundgesetze—whether there is some
other relation R such that the extension of a concept F is identical to the
extension of the concept “is R-related to –α(F (α))”. For any such R, it must
be the case that:
(∀x)(F (x)↔ R(x, –ε(F ())))
holds. He then points out that his application operator “S”, which we shall
return to below, satisfies this constraint.
What is obvious from all of this is that Frege has a deep understanding
of the perils that came with identifying extensions with their singletons. But,
no one was (or likely is) more knowledgable about the technical intricacies
of the formal system of Grundgesetze and their philosophical implications
than Frege. Hence, it seems very unlikely that he would not have realized
the consequences the problem of the singleton has for his earlier definitional
strategy by the time of Grundgesetze.
4 Identifying Abstracts in Grundgesetze
Frege’s Grundlagen definitions (that is, the results of applying the simple
recipe using the second option), as well as almost all of Frege’s Grundgesetze
definitions, can be seen as instances of a more general method: the generalized
recipe. With a single exception—the definition of the application operator
“S”, which we will return to later—Frege’s definitions in Grundgesetze fall
into three categories:
First, there are definitions of particular singular terms, such as zero
“0” (definition Θ), one “1” (definition I), Endlos “i” (definition M), and
definitions of particular relation symbols such as the successor relation s
(definition H). With respect to the latter (and other particular relations
defined later in Grundgesetze), Frege does not provide a definition of the
successor relation in the modern sense, but rather identifies the object that
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is the double value-range of the relation in question. Hence, these definitions
are all straightforward identifications of specific objects—in particular, of
specific single or double value-ranges.
Second, there are definitions of what modern readers would naturally
think of as (open or ‘unsaturated’) function or relation symbols, but which
Frege formalized as (double value-ranges of) functions from value-ranges to
value-ranges. In addition to the cardinal number operation discussed above
(a function from concepts to extensions), these include basic operations on
relations, including the composition of relations p and q (Definition B):
–α–ε
(
r εS(rSp)
rS(αSq)
)
= pLq
the converse of a relation p (Definition E):
–α–ε(αS(εSp)) = Up
and the coupling of relations p and q (Definition O):
–α–ε

a o d c cS(oSp)
ε = c;d
dS(aSq)
α = o;a

= pPq
Each of these definitions identifies a function that takes objects (including
double value-ranges of relations) as arguments, and provides the double
value-range of another relation as value.
Third, we have definitions of what modern readers would naturally identify
as predicates, but which Frege takes to be function symbols designating
functions from objects (again, including single or double value-ranges) to
truth-values. The first example of such a ‘predicate’ is Frege’s definition Γ: e d a d = aeS(aSp)
eS(dSp)
= Ip
—the definition of the single-valuedness of a relation. Given any particular
double value-range p as argument, this expression denotes a truth-value:19
19Of course, as we have already seen, Frege in Grundgesetze identifies truth-values
with value-ranges—in particular, with their own singletons. Thus, Frege’s definitions of
‘predicates’ such as “I” are, in fact, functions from value-ranges to value-ranges. Since
Frege’s identification of truth-values with their singletons is never codified in an official basic
law, however, but occurs instead in ‘unofficial’ philosophical discussion of the formalism
(see Grundgesetze §10, vol. I), the wording given above is preferred.
The point—that is, the real distinction between Frege’s treatment of operations on
relations such as “L”, “U”, and “P”, and his treatment of ‘predicates’ such as “I”—is
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the True if the relation is single-valued—that is, if it is a function—and the
False if it is not.
So how does Frege arrive at these particular definitions, and why do they
fall into these three categories? These definitions follow from an application
of the generalized recipe, which can be rationally reconstructed as follows:
Step 1: Identify the underlying concept ΦC such that C’s are
C’s of ΦC ’s.
20
Step 2: Formulate the identity conditions for C’s in terms of
some appropriate relation ΨC on the underlying domain of ΦC ’s
such that:
∀φ1, ...φn, φn+1, ...φ2n ∈ ΦC
[C(φ1, ...φn) = C(φn+1, ...φ2n)↔ ΨC(φ1, ...φn, φn+1, ...φ2n)]
Step 2.5: Via applications of Basic Law V, transform the right-
hand-side of the biconditional into an identity:
ΨC(φ1, ...φn, φn+1, ...φ2n)↔ fC(φ1, ...φn) = fC(φn+1, ...φ2n)
Step 3: Identify the C’s with the range of fC . In particular:
C(φ1, ...φn) = fC(φ1, ...φn)
The generalized recipe involves two modifications to the simple recipe. The
first is replacing Step 2 in the former with a more general and flexible
two-step process (Step 2 and Step 2.5). The second modification is the
deletion of Step 4. These modifications are both natural and necessary
in order to carry out the work Frege wishes to carry out in Grundgesetze.
In the following, we will illustrate how the first modification is essential in
capturing Frege’s Grundgesetze definitions and explore some technical and
that he did not define the latter as the extension of the concept holding of exactly those
objects satisfying the predicate. In short, he did not define “I” as:
–ε
 e d a d = aeS(aSε)
eS(dSε)
= I
parallel to his definitions of “L”, “U”, and “P”, and then write “pSI” instead of “Ip”. The
fact that Frege’s definitions of ‘binary operators’ such as “L”, “U”, and “P” are formulated
as functions from pairs of objects to double value-ranges (which are not truth-values, even
on Frege’s identification of truth-values with their singletons), while unary function symbols
(i.e. ‘predicates’) such as “I” are defined as functions from objects to truth-values, deserves
further scrutiny.
20By the time of Grundgesetze, for Frege the underlying ΦCs are always some class
of objects, including single- and double value-ranges. Thus, numbers are, at least in a
technical sense, not directly numbers of first-level concepts, but are instead numbers of the
extensions of first-level concepts.
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philosophical consequences of this fact. Then, after three short digressions,
we will conclude the paper by examining the second modification to the
recipe, i.e. abolishing Step 4.
When applying the generalized recipe to unary operations that provide
us access to numbers, directions, and shapes, the result is equivalent to that
obtained when applying the simple recipe, although the details involved in
getting to this final result are sometimes different.21 For example, letting our
concept C be cardinal number, the underlying ΦC is just the first-level
concept extension of a first-level concept. At Step 2 we note that
cardinal numbers are individuated in terms of equinumerousity—that is:
(∀φ1)(∀φ2)[”(φ1) = ”(φ2)↔ φ1 ≈ φ2]
Note that the number operator ” now attaches, not to concepts, but to
objects—that is, φ1 and φ2 are now first-order variables (further, we are again
utilizing Frege’s understanding of equinumerousity as a relation between
extensions of concepts).22 We then note that the right-hand side is equivalent
to:
(∀z)(z ≈ φ1 ↔ z ≈ φ2)
which, via Basic Law V (and some straightforward logical manipulation) is
equivalent to:
–α(α ≈ φ1) = –α(α ≈ φ2)
Hence, on the generalized recipe, the cardinal number of x, for any object x,
is the equivalence class of extensions of concepts equinumerous to x:
”(x) = –α(α ≈ x)
If x is the extension of a concept:
x = –ε(F (ε))
however, then on the Grundgesetze account ”(x) will (speaking a bit loosely)
pick out the same extension as ”(F ) picked out on the Grundlagen simple
recipe account.
We can also apply the generalized recipe to arrive at Frege’s definition
of the pairing operation “;” (Definition Ξ). The concept C in question
is (ordered) pair. The underlying concept ΦC such that C’s are C’s of
ΦC ’s is the concept object (Step 1). Things get a bit trickier at Step 2
and Step 2.5, however, since we are no longer looking for an equivalence
relation on objects, but an ‘equivalence relation’-like four-place relation. For
21In particular, and unlike the simple recipe, on the generalized recipe all definitions will
take objects—usually but not necessarily extensions of concepts—as arguments.
22Note that, as a result, ” is defined for all objects, but it need only be ‘well-behaved’
in the intended case, where “x” is the extension of a concept.
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the contemporary reader, with a century of sophisticated set theory under
her belt, the appropriate relation with which to begin is obvious—pairwise
identity:
∀φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4 ∈ ΦC [φ1;φ2 = φ3;φ4 ↔ (φ1 = φ3 ∧ φ2 = φ4)]
We now note that the right-hand-side is equivalent to:23
(∀R)(R(φ1, φ2)↔ R(φ3, φ4))
which is in turn equivalent to:24
∀R(φ1S(φ2S–ε–α(Rεα)) = φ3S(φ4S–ε–α(Rεα)))
which, again via Basic Law V, becomes:
–ε(φ1S(φ2Sε)) =
–ε(φ3S(φ4Sε))
We now have the required identity, and can apply Step 3:
x; y = –ε(xS(ySε))
and we arrive at Frege’s definition of ordered pair.25
In order to justify our claim that all of Frege’s Grundgesetze definitions
(with the exception of “S”) flow naturally from the generalized recipe, it
is worth working though a different example—the definition of the single-
valuedness of a function (Definition Γ). This function maps double value-
ranges of relations to truth-values, so the underlying concept ΦC is just
double value-range. Equally straightforward is the application of Step
2—formulating the identity conditions. Since “I” is the sign of a function
from objects to truth-values, determining the identity conditions for I just
amounts to determining which arguments are mapped to the True, and which
arguments are mapped to the False. Hence:
(∀φ1)(∀φ2)[I(φ1) = I(φ2)
↔ ((∀z)(∀w)(zS(wSφ1)→ (∀v)(zS(vSφ1)→ w = v))
↔ (∀z)(∀w)(zS(wSφ2)→ (∀v)(zS(vSφ2)→ w = v))]
23We think it is worth noting that it seems likely to us that Frege himself started with
this universally quantified second-order formula.
24We use Frege’s application operator “S” in order to capture Frege’s official definition.
We will say more about this operator below, for the moment it can be understood akin to
membership.
25The remainder of Frege’s Grundgesetze definitions, including definitions ∆, K, Λ, N, Π
P, Σ, T, Υ, Φ, X, Ψ, Ω, AA, AB, AΓ follow a similar pattern. In future work we plan to
show explicitly that all of these definitions result from straightforward application of the
generalized recipe.
18
In short, the truth-value denoted by Iφ1 is identical to the truth-value
denoted by Iφ2, if and only if the claim that φ1 is the double value-range of
a single-valued relation (i.e. a function) is equivalent to the claim that φ2
is the double value-range of a single-valued relation. While this formula is
complex, we can easily apply Step 2.5 by reminding ourselves that there
is no distinction between logical equivalence and identity in Grundgesetze.
Hence the right-hand-side of the above is equivalent to:
((∀z)(∀w)(zS(wSφ1)→ (∀v)(zS(vSφ1)→ w = v))
= (∀z)(∀w)(zS(wSφ2)→ (∀v)(zS(vSφ2)→ w = v))]
and we can now apply Step 3 to arrive at Frege’s definition:
Ix = (∀z)(∀w)(zS(wSx)→ (∀v)(zS(vSx)→ w = v))
We hope these examples suffice to show that Frege’s Grundgesetze defi-
nitions share a certain structure which is characterised by the generalized
recipe. What best explains the (surprising) uniformity of the Grundgesetze
definitions is that Frege was aware of this recipe—or, at least, one that is very
much like it— and so, we believe there are good grounds for thinking that
Frege followed the generalized recipe when composing his magnum opus.26
Before concluding with a discussion of the consequences of this general
definitional strategy for an adequate interpretation of Frege’s mature philos-
ophy of mathematics, there are three issues that need to be addressed: the
first involves extant criticisms of Frege’s definitions in Grundgesetze to the
effect that his methodology is completely arbitrary. The second issue is to
demonstrate that the generalized recipe can be applied in such a way as to
avoid the problems that plagued the simple recipe—in particular, the problem
of the singleton. The final issue is to examine closely the one exception to
the generalized recipe, in order to show why this case must have been an
exception on Frege’s account.
4.1 The Generalized Recipe and Arbitrariness
Richard Heck (following Michael Dummett), has suggested that Frege’s
definitions in Grundgesetze are almost entirely arbitrary—that is, that Frege
could have chosen just about any extensions whatsoever to be the referents
of the various notions given explicit definitions in Grundgesetze:
26Admittedly, there is, as far as we know, no explicit mention of a recipe of this kind in
Frege’s published writing. According to (Veraart, 1976), Frege’s Nachlaß contained many
pages of “formulae” which could have offered us a better insight into how Frege arrived at
the definition that he actually gives. As is well-known, however, most of the Nachlaß was
lost during an air raid at the end of the second world war. See, however, (Wehmeier and
Schmidt am Busch, 2005).
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In Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics, Michael Dummett argues
that Frege’s explicit definition of numerical terms is intended to
serve just two purposes: To solve the Caesar problem, that is,
to “fix the reference of each numerical term uniquely”, and “to
yield” HP ((Dummett, 1991), ch. 14). The explicit definition
is in certain respects arbitrary, since numbers may be identified
with a variety of different extensions (or sets, or possibly objects
of still other sorts): there is, e.g., no particular reason that the
number six must be identified with the extension of the concept
“is a concept under which six objects fall”; it could be identified
with the extension of the concept “is a concept under which only
the numbers zero through five fall” or that of “is a concept under
which no more than six objects fall”.
(Heck, 2011), p. 95.
However, in a postscript added to this essay in the excellent collection
entitled Frege’s Theorem, Heck revises his earlier claims. He writes of the
‘arbitrariness’ charge:
This claim now seems to me to be over-stated, [. . . ]. In particular,
it now seems to me that there is a strong case to be made that
the particular explicit definition that Frege gives—assuming that
we are going to give an explicit definition—is almost completely
forced. [. . . ]
So consider the matter quite generally. We have some equivalence
relation ξRη, and we want to define a function ρ(ξ) in such a
way as to validate the corresponding abstraction principle:
ρ(x) = ρ(y)↔ xRy
How, in general, can we do this? So far as I can see, the only
general strategy that is available here is essentially the one Frege
adopts: Take ρ(x) to be x’s equivalence class under R, that is,
the extension of the concept xRξ.
(Heck, 2011), p. 109.
Heck would be absolutely right had Frege applied the simple recipe. In fact,
the simple recipe, as we described it above, delivers exactly this result!
As we have already seen, however, the simple recipe is inadequate: it
is susceptible to the problem of the singleton, and it does not generalize
straightforwardly to non-unary abstracts. By the time of Grundgesetze,
Frege had adopted the more powerful, but also more flexible, generalized
recipe. As a result, the correct reading of Frege’s mature Grundgesetze
definitions is somewhere between the ‘completely arbitrary’ understanding
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suggested by the initial Heck quote and the ‘completely forced’ understanding
suggested by the postscript. In fact, any of the definitions Heck considers
in the passage above could be arrived at via the generalized recipe as ‘the’
definition of cardinal numbers.
Since constructions of such alternate definitions of cardinal numbers
are familiar, we will illustrate this phenomenon with a different example—
Frege’s definition of the ordered pair operation “;”. Recall that we began
our reconstruction of Frege’s definition of ordered pairs (as, loosely speaking,
sets of all relations that relate the objects in question in the appropriate
order) by noting that the following provides the correct identity conditions.
∀φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4 ∈ ΦC [φ1;φ2 = φ3;φ4 ↔ (φ1 = φ3 ∧ φ2 = φ4)]
Thus, Step 1 and Step 2 remain as before. The difference comes in how
we carry out Step 2.5. Here, we will note that the right-hand side of the
above is equivalent to:
(∀x)(∀y)((x = φ1 ∧ y = φ2)↔ (x = φ3 ∧ y = φ4))
Two applications of Basic Law V then provide:
–α–ε(ε = φ1 ∧ α = φ2) = –α–ε(ε = φ3 ∧ α = φ4)
We now have the required identity, and can apply Step 3, resulting in the
following definition of ordered pair:
x; y = –α–ε(ε = x ∧ α = y)
In short, on this application of the generalized recipe, the ordered pair of x
and y is not (speaking loosely) the set of all relations that holds of x and y
(in that order), but is instead the single relation that relates x to y (again,
in that order) and relates nothing else to anything else.27
Thus, the generalized recipe does not generate a unique definition, but
it is instead a general method for arriving at one of a number of equally
adequate definitions. As a result, there is a measure of arbitrariness present
in Frege’s mature account of definitions in Grundgesetze. This point should
not be overstated, however: The method does not license an ‘anything-goes’
approach to definition. In particular, it is not the case that given any
acceptable definition of the form:
f(x1, x2, ...xn) = Φ(x1, x2, ...xn)
27Other paths to the requisite identity on the right hand side are possible. For example,
one can carry out Step 2.5 in such a way as to arrive at a Fregean version of the Kuratowski
definition of ordered pair—that is:
x; y = –ε(ε = –α(α = x) ∨ ε = –α(α = x ∨ α = y))
Details are left to the reader.
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and any arbitrary one-to-one function g, that:
f(x1, x2, ...xn) = g(Φ(x1, x2, ...xn))
is also an acceptable definition. On the contrary, according to the generalized
recipe, any acceptable definition must proceed by moving from appropriate
identity conditions (Step 2) via logical laws (including Basic Law V) to
an appropriate identity (Step 2.5). Thus, while the generalized recipe is
open-ended—sanctioning more than one possible definition but, presumably,
allowing no more than one at once—it does not sanction just any definition
that might get the identity conditions correct.
A final question remains: Why did Frege select the particular definitions
that he did select, rather than one or another of the other possibilities?
Here we can at best speculate, but we suspect the answer will lie in a
combination of two factors. First, there is the issue of technical convenience.
Some generalized recipe definitions of a particular concept will be more
fruitful or more economical than others in terms of the role they play in
the constructions and proofs that Frege wishes to carry out in Grundgesetze.
Second, there is the issue of applications and what is now called Frege’s
Constraint—the thought that an account of the application of a mathematical
concept should flow immediately from the definition of that concept (see,
e.g. (Frege, 1903), §159, p. 157). Clearly, some definitions will satisfy Frege’s
Constraint more easily and more straightforwardly than others.28
Making such judgements with regard to one proposed definition rather
than another will not always be simple, however. At an intuitive level,
both the convenience/fruitfulness/economy consideration and the Frege’s
Constraint consideration seem to weigh in favor of Frege’s preferred definition
of number rather than any of the alternative constructions suggested by
Heck. But the case for Frege’s preferred definition of ordered pair, rather
than the alternative construction just given, is not so clear. It will require a
detailed examination of the role that ordered pairs play in the derivations of
Grundgesetze and the way the notion of pair is applied more generally. For
now, since we have other fish to fry, we will remain content having raised
this interpretational question.29
4.2 Arbitrariness and the problem of the singleton
Since we began this section with the observation that the explicit definitions
given in Grundlagen can be recaptured by application of the generalized
recipe, the natural question to ask next is whether an application of the
28An obvious third consideration is simplicity. Thus, it would be perverse for Frege
to identify numbers with the singletons of the objects that he does identify as numbers,
even though such a definition can be obtained via the generalized recipe and does get the
identity conditions for numbers correct.
29Needless to say, we plan to return to this issue in future work.
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generalized recipe to extensions themselves will fall prey to the problem of
the singleton. The answer to this question is, in an interesting and important
sense, “yes” and “no”. In more detail: some applications of the generalized
recipe do run afoul of the problem of the singleton, but not all do.
In applying the generalized recipe to extensions, Step 1 and Step 2 are
straightforward: the concept C in question is extension, the underlying
concept ΦC such that C’s are C’s of ΦC ’s is the concept (first-level)
concept, and the appropriate equivalence relation on concepts is coexten-
sionality. Thus, we have:
–ε(F (ε)) = –ε(G(ε))↔ (∀x)(F (x)↔ G(x))
We can now apply Basic Law V to the right-hand side, and obtain:
–ε(F (ε)) = –ε(G(ε))↔ –ε(F (ε)) = –ε(G(ε))
With Step 2.5 completed, we can apply Step 3 and obtain the following
innocuous identity:
–ε(F (ε)) = –ε(F (ε))
So far, so good—the most natural way of applying the generalized recipe
turns out to be immune to the problem of the singleton.
The problem is that Step 2.5—the real culprit in the arbitrariness
issue—only requires that we transform the right-hand side of the abstraction
principle formulated in Step 2 into an identity. It does not provide any
particular guidance on how to do so, nor does it guarantee that there will be
only one such identity that can be reached via the application of basic laws
and rules of inference. Thus, in carrying out Step 2 above, we could have
applied Basic Law V to the right-hand side to obtain:
–ε(F (ε)) = –ε(G(ε))↔ –ε(F (ε)) = –ε(G(ε))
then applied some basic logic to obtain:
–ε(F (ε)) = –ε(G(ε))↔ (∀x)(x = –ε(F (ε))↔ x = –ε(G(ε)))
and then applied Basic Law V again to obtain:
–ε(F (ε)) = –ε(G(ε))↔ –α(α = –ε(F (ε))) = –α(α = –ε(G(ε)))
Applying Step 3 at this stage would result in the following identification:
–ε(F (ε)) = –α(α = –ε(F (ε)))
This, however, is exactly the identity that got us into trouble in the first place.
Thus, the generalized recipe can be applied safely to extensions themselves,
but not all such applications are safe. What, then, does this tell us about
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the arbitrariness of the generalized recipe itself, and how we are meant to
apply it in potentially problematic cases?
One possible response is to formulate some additional principles guiding
the application of the recipe—principles that legitimate the first of the two
applications of the generalized recipe to extensions, while ruling out the
second application as illegitimate. Supplementing the recipe in this manner,
if it were possible, could perhaps be done in such a way as to eliminate all
arbitrariness whatsoever, salvaging the idea that Frege’s methods provide
a unique definition of each mathematical concept. Such an account would
be attractive, but let us raise a problem for it (though there might be many
more).
It is not clear how to formulate such constraints on Step 2.5 in the first
place. In comparing the two constructions above, one is immediately struck
by the fact that, in the second, problematic construction, we had already
obtained an identity of the requisite form:
–ε(F (ε)) = –ε(G(ε))↔ –ε(F (ε)) = –ε(G(ε))
but then continued to manipulate the right-hand side until we had obtained
a second such identity, to which an application of Step 3 provided the
problem of the singleton-susceptible definition. Thus, one natural thought is
to require that the application of Step 2.5 terminate at the first instance of
an appropriate identity on the right-hand side. While such a rule would block
the second construction above, it does not block an alternate construction
that terminates with the same identity, and hence (via application of Step
3) provides the same problematic identification of extensions with their
singletons. We begin with the same equivalence relation on the right, and,
applying some straightforward logic, arrive at:
–ε(F (ε)) = –ε(G(ε))↔ (∀H)((∀x)(H(x)↔ F (x))↔ (∀x)(H(x)↔ G(x)))
Two applications of Basic Law V provide us with:
–ε(F (ε)) = –ε(G(ε))↔ (∀H)(–ε(H(ε)) = –ε(F (ε))↔ –ε(H(ε)) = –ε(G(ε)))
We then obtain:
–ε(F (ε)) = –ε(G(ε))↔ (∀x)(x = –ε(F (ε))↔ x = –ε(G(ε)))
via more logic, and apply Basic Law V in order to obtain the problematic
identity:
–ε(F (ε)) = –ε(G(ε))↔ –α(α = –ε(F (ε))) = –α(α = –ε(G(ε)))
Thus, requiring that Step 2.5 halts at the first appropriate identity does
not block the problematic construction.30
30Note that, although Frege does not distinguish between biconditionals and identities,
the intermediate formulas in the construction above involve universal quantifications of
identities/biconditionals, and hence are not identities themselves.
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That being said, there obviously is something fishy about the implemen-
tations of the generalized recipe that results in the problem of the singleton.
Of course, it is possible that Frege would have rejected these constructions
based on the sort of consideration discussed in the previous section: they
introduce an understanding of the concept extension that is less convenient,
less fruitful, and less simple than the original construction (and maybe they
also violate Frege’s Constraint). But there is another reason for rejecting
them as legitimate applications of the generalized recipe: they violate logical
constraints on the provision of adequate identity conditions for mathematical
objects. Since the generalized recipe proceeds via explicit consideration of
such identity conditions, it seems plausible that any application of the recipe
should, in the end, respect such constraints. Frege was well aware of the
need to respect logical and metaphysical constraints when proposing identi-
ties: Frege’s permutation argument in §10 of Grundgesetze is, in effect, an
argument which shows that identifying the truth values with their singletons
will not generate logical difficulties of exactly the sort that would arise were
he to identify all objects with their singletons more generally.31
This provides an additional criterion by which Frege might judge particu-
lar applications of the recipe, and which can thus be used to help explain why
he arrived at the particular definitions codified in Grundgesetze: in addition
to respecting considerations of simplicity and fruitfulness, and adhering to
Frege’s Constraint, applications of the generalized recipe should not bring
with them logical difficulties of the sort exemplified by the problem of the sin-
gleton.32 From this perspective, then, the fact that there is a well-motivated
implementation of the generalized recipe that does not give rise to the problem
of the singleton, might well be enough to regard the generalized recipe to be
in good standing with respect to that very problem.
31Of course, the identification of truth values with their singletons is, as we have already
emphasized, not carried out via an official definition or axiom within the formal system of
Grundgesetze, but is instead merely a ‘meta’-level methodological stipulation. Nevertheless,
the discussion in §10 of Grundgesetze makes it clear that Frege was explicitly aware of the
sort of logical constraints that weigh in favor of the simpler application of the generalized
recipe to extensions.
32Note that the sort of logical difficulty at issue is not restricted to applications of the
generalized recipe to extensions, but would also apply if Frege were to codify his identification
of truth values with their singletons within the formal system of Grundgesetze. Similar
logical constraints would govern cases where the generalized recipe were applied to two
distinct concepts with non-disjoint extensions, since the definitions would need to be
logically compatible on those objects falling under both concepts.
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4.3 The exception to the generalized recipe
The only exception to the generalized recipe is definition A—the definition
of the application operation “S”:
K–α
(
g g(a) = α
u = –εg(ε)
)
= aSu
aSu is the value of the function f applied to the argument a where u is
the value-range of f (when u is not a value-range, then aSu refers to the
value-range of the function that maps every object to the false—that is, to
–ε( ε = ε).)
Of particular interest is the case where u is the extension of a concept
C (that is, C is a function from objects to truth-values), where aSu will
be the True if C holds of a, and the False otherwise. As a result, when
applied to extensions, S is, in effect, a Fregean analogue of the set-theoretic
membership relation ∈, and Frege often uses S as a membership relation on
extension of concepts.33
What is most notable about S for our purposes, however, is that it is
an exception to the account of the Grundgesetze definitions sketched above:
Freges application operator S is neither a definition of a specific object nor
is it the result of an application of the generalized recipe to obtain definitions
of unary predicates or definitions of binary functions on value-ranges, but
it is a unique fourth case. It is therefore likely no accident that this is the
very first definition Frege provides in Grundgesetze, since it not only plays a
critical role in the later constructions (as a quick perusal of its use in the
remaining definitions and central theorems makes clear), but it also plays a
unique role in Frege’s approach to definition.
In order to see why definition A is special, it is worth working through
what would result if we attempted to arrive at a definition of “S” via the
generalized recipe. S is a function that takes two objects as arguments, and,
when the latter argument is the value-range of a function, gives the value
of that function applied to the first argument. Hence, applying Step 1 and
Step 2 of the recipe, we obtain something like:
(∀x)(∀y)(∀z)(∀w)[xSy = zSw
↔ (∀v)[(∃f)(y = –ε(f(ε) ∧ f(x) = v)
↔ (∃f)(w = –ε(f(ε) ∧ f(z) = v)]
Via Basic Law V, we can see that the right-hand side of the formula above
is equivalent to:
–ε((∃f)(y = –ε(f(ε) ∧ f(x) = ε)) = –ε((∃f)(w = –ε(f(ε) ∧ f(z) = ε))
33Frege himself glosses this operation as the “Relation of an object falling within the
extension of a concept” (Frege, 1893), p. 240.
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With the identity required by Step 2.5 in hand, we can then suggest the
following definition:
xSy = –ε((∃f)(y = –ε(f(ε) ∧ f(x) = ε))
This definition gets the identity conditions right, but there is an immediate,
and obvious, problem: This definition does not give us the value of the
function f applied to argument x, where y = –ε(f(ε)), but instead provides
us with the singleton of f(x). As we have already shown, however, Frege
was quite aware of the dangers of haphazardly conflating objects with their
singletons, so it should come as no surprise that Frege does not adopt the
incorrect definition above, but instead applies the ‘singleton-stripping’34
operation K to this formulation, obtaining the correct definition:
xSy = K–ε((∃f)(y = –ε(f(ε) ∧ f(x) = ε))
Thus, Definition A is the sole exception to the generalized recipe since it
requires an additional step.
Why is Definition A different from the remaining definitions in Grundge-
setze? The answer is surprisingly straightforward. Throughout the rest of
Grundgesetze, each definition introduces a new concept, function, or other
operation by identifying the range of that concept, function, or operation with
a sub-collection of the universe of value-ranges. In short, Frege is defining
new concepts by identifying their ranges with objects taken from the old, and
constant, domain. As a result, it is sufficient for his purposes in these cases
merely to identify some objects with the right identity conditions (modulo
the possible additional constraints touched on in the previous subsections),
and this is exactly what the generalized recipe accomplishes.
With the definition of S something very different is going on. In this
case, Frege is not attempting to introduce some new concept, instead he is
attempting to formulate a new way of getting at an already understood and
fully specified operation—function application. As Frege puts it:
It has already been observed in §25 that first-level functions can
be used instead of second-level functions in what follows. This
will now be shown. As was indicated, this is made possible by
the fact that the functions appearing as arguments of second-
level functions are represented by their value-ranges, although of
34The ‘singleton stripping’ (or backslash) operator is a unary function from objects to
objects such that (compare (Frege, 1893), §11, p. 19):
f(a) = b if a = –ε(b = ε)
= a otherwise.
In short, Frege’s backslash is an object-level function that, when applied to the extension
of a concept, serves the same purpose as a Rusellian definite description operator when
applied directly to that concept.
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course not in such a way that they simply concede their places to
them, for that is impossible. In the first instance, our concern is
only to designate the value of the function Φ(ξ) for the argument
∆, that is, Φ(∆), using ‘∆’ and ‘–εΦ(ε)’.
(Frege, 1893), §34, p. 52.
In short, Frege needs a definition of “S” that not only guarantees that the
objects ‘introduced’ have the right identity conditions, but in addition that
they are the right objects. As a result, Definition A is of a very different sort
than the definitions that follow it, and so it should not be surprising that it
does not follow the pattern provided by the generalized recipe.
5 Applications and consequences
We believe that the general recipe not only provides an accurate and illumi-
nating rational reconstruction of Frege’s method of definition in Grundgesetze,
but that he knowingly applied this methodology (or something very similar).
As mentioned before, it would be hard to explain the uniformity of the
Grundgesetze definitions if Frege did not have a methodological template
of this sort in mind. However, we shall not here offer a further defence of
the claim that Frege’s use of the generalized recipe was explicit. Instead, we
shall conclude by showing how awareness and appreciation of the role of the
generalized recipe in Frege’s Grundgesetze can shed a new light on a number
of difficult interpretative issues in Frege scholarship.35
5.1 The role of Basic Law V in Grundgesetze
As has been shown by Richard Heck36, Frege did not make much real use of
Basic Law V in the derivations found in part II of Grundgesetze—Frege’s
only ineliminable appeal to Basic Law V is in deriving each direction of
Hume’s Principle. Most other occurrences of value-ranges, and applications
of Basic Law V to manipulate them, are easily eliminable. This raises a
fundamental question about the role of Basic Law V in Frege’s philosophy of
mathematics—one forcefully formulated by Heck:
How can an axiom which plays such a limited formal role be of
such fundamental importance to Frege’s philosophy of mathemat-
ics?
(Heck, 2011), p. 65.
35Here we will address only two such topics, but we believe that the account of definition
given here can also provide insights into the Caesar problem, Frege’s reconstruction of real
analysis, and his views on geometry, amongst other things. We plan on returning to these
topics in future work.
36See his (Heck, 1993).
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Clearly, Frege did attach fundamental importance to Basic Law V. Consider,
for example, the Afterword of Grundgesetze, where, faced with Russell’s
paradox, he attempts to provide a ‘correction’ to his conception of value-
ranges. Frege does not, as might be expected given the limited formal role
that Basic Law V plays, suggest that we abandon extensions altogether,
but instead suggests that a slight modification of our understanding of
value-ranges is all that is needed:
So presumably nothing remains but to recognise extensions of
concepts or classes as objects in the full and proper sense of
the word, but to concede at the same time that the erstwhile
understanding of the words “extension of a concept” requires
correction.
(Frege, 1903), Afterword, p. 255-56 (our italics).
After he introduces the principle that introduces the ‘improved’ understanding
of extensions—Basic Law V′—he closes the Afterword by stating that:
This question may be viewed as the fundamental problem of
arithmetic: how are we to apprehend logical objects, in particular,
the numbers? What justifies us to acknowledge numbers as
objects? Even if this problem is not solved to the extent that I
thought it was when composing this volume, I do not doubt that
the path to the solution is found.
(Frege, 1903), Afterword, p. 265.
So, for Frege there is no doubt that something in the spirit of Basic Law V
captures the “characteristic constitution” of value-ranges, and that value-
ranges play a central role in his philosophical project—a role they continue
to play even when confronted with the paradox. But how are we to square
Frege’s insistence on the importance of Basic Law V (or some variant of
it such as Basic Law V′) with the limited formal role that it plays in the
derivations of Grundgesetze?
Our interpretation of Frege’s Grundgesetze highlights a central role played
by Basic Law V—one distinct from its role as an axiom within the formal
system of Grundgesetze. The generalized recipe relies fundamentally on Basic
Law V (or, more carefully, on a metatheoretic analogue of Basic Law V which
is first introduced in vol. I, §3 and §9), since applications of Basic Law V
are required (in most cases) in order to move from the statement of identity
conditions (Step 2) to the required identity between objects (Step 2.5).
Thus, the role played by Basic Law V (and, later, by Basic Law V′) is broader
than merely providing the identity conditions for value-ranges! Instead, it
also plays a central role in identifying which value-ranges are the objects
‘falling under’ all other mathematical concepts. In short, its role is not only
logical—as a central principle of the formal system of Grundgesetze—but
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also epistemological and metaphysical, since it is a central component of the
method by which we define mathematical concepts and identify mathematical
objects such as cardinal numbers and ordered pairs. As a result, and in
retrospect, it should not be too surprising that Basic Law V plays a limited
role in the formal proofs of Grundgesetze, since this formal work consists
merely of unpacking the real work carried out by Basic Law V: the (informal,
metatheoretical) formulation of accurate and adequate definitions prior to
formal derivations—that is, its role in the generalized recipe.37
5.2 The role of Hume’s Principle in Grundgesetze
A second issue of interest here, and extensively discussed in Richard Heck’s
writings38, is the role of Hume’s Principle in Frege’s mature philosophy of
mathematics. As we noted in section 1, Frege appeals to Hume’s Principle
in §62 of Grundlagen when attempting to explain how numbers are given
to us. Frege ultimately rejects Hume’s Principle as a definition of number
and opts instead for the explicit definition of cardinal numbers as a type of
extension. Nevertheless, Frege explicitly requires that any value-range based
definition should allow us to prove Hume’s Principle, and Hume’s Principle
continues to plays a central role throughout the remainder of Grundlagen.
Given the continued appearance of Hume’s Principle (and similar informal
principles) throughout Grundlagen, we think that this principle played two
separate (but interrelated) roles in Frege’s philosophy of mathematics at this
point even after it was rejected as a definition. First, Hume’s Principle as an
informal meta-theoretical principle provides the correct identity conditions
for cardinal numbers and guides the formulation of a definition of cardinal
numbers (i.e. whatever extensions are chosen, they must have the identity
conditions codified by Hume’s Principle). Second, Hume’s Principle, as a
formula of the—in Grundlagen informal—object language, constitutes an
adequacy condition on any explicit definition of cardinal numbers in terms of
extensions (or in terms of anything else, for that matter): whatever definition
we choose, it must demonstrably provide the right identity conditions; the
way to provide such a guarantee is to require that it proof-theoretically entails
the formula that codifies those identity conditions—that is, the definition
must entail Hume’s Principle.
This all seems straightforward enough, but we now arrive at a puzzle: why
is it that Frege does not mention Hume’s Principle, or even explicitly prove it
in full biconditional form, in Grundgesetze? Frege does prove each direction
individually, but he does not put them together into a biconditional/identity
claim. As already noted, Frege does not explicitly prove Hume’s Principle in
full in Grundlagen either, but the proof sketch of the right-to-left direction
37In (Ebert and Rossberg, 2016b) we argue that Frege draws on exactly this further role
of BLV in the rather intriguing passages §146 and §147 of volume II of Grundgesetze.
38See for example (Heck, 1995) and (Heck, 2005).
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in §73, plus the footnote at the end of the same section addressing the left-to-
right direction, are, we think, meant to jointly indicate the existence of such a
proof. Moreover, Frege often talks of Hume’s Principle in biconditional form
in the prose in Grundlagen. In contrast, in Grundgesetze the two directions
of Hume’s Principle are proven in different chapters (A and B respectively)
with no indication that they are to be ‘put together’ or that anything might
be gained by doing so.39 Also, there is no mention of Hume’s Principle as
a biconditional in the prose of Grundgesetze. Interestingely, the sections of
Grundgesetze where the definition of natural number is provided (§§38-46)
refer to §68 of Grundlagen (where the explicit definition of cardinal number
is first given), §§71-72 of Grundlagen (where the definition of equinumerosity
is formulated), and §§74-79 of Grundlagen (where explicitly definitions of
0, 1, and successor are formulated, and sketches of the Peano axioms are
given). Striking in its absence is any mention of §73 of Grundlagen where
the sketch of the proof of Hume’s Principle is given.40 Taken together, this
suggests that the role of abstraction principles in Grundgesetze has changed
and that Hume’s Principle, understood as a constraint on any adequate
definition of cardinal number, has disappeared in Grundgesetze. How are we
to reconcile the fundamentality of Hume’s Principle in the philosophy of the
Grundlagen-Frege with the fact that it plays a far less important role in the
philosophy of the Grundgesetze-Frege?
Once we are aware of the difference between the simple recipe and the
generalized recipe, an explanation is not hard to come by. Sometime between
Grundlagen and Grundgesetze Frege must have realized that, if Step 2 of the
generalized recipe is carried out correctly—that is, if, in the case of cardinal
numbers, Hume’s Principle (or the metatheoretical analogue given above) is
used to provide the identity conditions for cardinal numbers—then Step 4 of
the simple recipe is redundant. There simply is no need to proof-theoretically
establish Hume’s Principle, qua abstraction principle, within the formalism
of Grundgesetze so long as the generalized recipe is carried out correctly,
and nothing that is of philosophical or mathematical importance would be
39We owe this important observation to (May and Wehmeier, 2016). Although they give
a different explanation for this odd fact than the one given here. They are the first to
suggest that Frege’s failure to ‘conjoin’ the two directions of Hume’s Principle is not merely
a technical quirk of the organization of Grundgesetze, but instead provides insights into
what Frege was up to. Thus, our own discussion owes much to their careful examination of
these issues.
40Frege does indeed mention §73 of Grundlagen later, in a footnote which we reproduce
in its entirety:
Compare Grundlagen, p. 86.
(Frege, 1893) §54, p. 72 (fn1).
This footnote does not concern the derivation of Hume’s Principle in Grundlagen §73,
however, but merely highlights the fact that Frege’s definition and elucidation of the
composition relation in Grundgesetze §56 is based on notions first presented in a sub-
portion of that derivation.
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achieved by putting together both sides of Hume’s Principle and proving the
formal counterpart in the language of Grundgesetze.
As a final observation, it is worth noting that these points might also
help to explain why Frege was not at all tempted to use Hume’s Principle as
a definition of cardinal number after he became aware of Russell’s paradox,
especially given Frege was arguably aware of the fact that Hume’s Principle
alone would entail all of the Peano axioms.41 Dropping Basic Law V leaves
Frege without a general means for defining mathematical objects—that is,
it forces him to abandon the generalized recipe (and the simple recipe, for
that matter) altogether. Hume’s Principle, or its metatheoretical analogue,
can (and does) provide the right identity conditions for cardinal numbers,
but it is insufficient to pick out which objects the cardinal numbers are.
Hume’s Principle simply cannot play the epistemological and metaphysical
role that Basic Law V was meant to play in Grundgesetze. Thus, without
Basic Law V (or some variant, such as Basic Law V′) Frege was left with no
means for defining and thereby introducing mathematical objects, and hence
no identifiable mathematical objects at all. This observation is, of course,
in stark contrast to the recent neo-logicist attempt to found arithmetic on
Hume’s Principle. In the following, we want to highlight one more important
difference between the two approaches.42
5.3 The definitional strategy and neo-logicism
Finally, it is worth observing that the ontology presupposed and utilized
by Frege in his application of the generalized recipe—or even the simple
recipe—differs markedly from recent neo-logicist approaches as defended
in (Wright, 1983), (Hale and Wright, 2001).43 Despite their Fregean roots,
neo-logicists reject the idea that objects falling under some mathematical
concept C should be identified with corresponding extensions or value-ranges.
Instead, given a mathematical concept C, the neo-logicist will provide an
abstraction principle of the form:
(∀α)(∀β)[@C(α) = @C(β)↔ EC(α, β)]
that defines the concept C by providing identity conditions (via the equiva-
lence relation EC(. . . , . . . )) for abstract objects falling under C (the referents
of abstraction terms @C(. . . )). Hence, on the neo-logicist approach cardinal
numbers and other abstract objects are not identified as being amongst some
more inclusive, previously identified range of objects. As result, a neo-logicist
41In fact, he does briefly consider, and immediately rejects, this option in a letter to
Russell. Compare (Gabriel et al., 1976), XXXVI/7, p. 224.
42Compare (Blanchette, 2016), who highlights further differences between the “Scottish”
neo-logicist and Frege’s logicism.
43For an overview of issues concerning this form of neo-logicism, see the introduction to
(Ebert and Rossberg, 2016a).
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does not require anything akin to Frege’s recipe and, thus, she is not plagued
by the sort of limited arbitrariness discussed previously: the abstract objects
falling under mathematical concepts just are whatever objects are delineated
by (acceptable) abstraction principles.
This plenitude of kinds of abstract objects comes at a cost, however:
the neo-logicist owes us a principled account of the truth-conditions of
cross-abstraction identity statements of the form:
@C1(α) = @C2(β)
where C1 and C2 are different mathematical concepts, defined by differ-
ent abstraction principles. This problem has come to be called the C−R
problem.44
In contrast, such cross-abstraction identities are easily resolved by Frege:
given two mathematical objects whose identity or distinctness might be
in question, we need merely determine which extensions the generalized
recipe identifies with those objects, and then apply Basic Law V to settle
the identity claim in question.45 Of course, given the arbitrariness in the
generalized recipe, it is possible that two objects that have been defined in
such a way as to be distinct might have been defined in some other manner
such that they would have been identical. But once a particular choice is
made, there is no C−R problem within Frege’s original logicist project as
developed in Grundgesetze.
As a result, we can now understand one aspect of the relation between
Frege’s logicism and his modern day neo-logicist successor in terms of adopt-
ing different approaches to a particular trade-off: Frege, in adopting the
generalized recipe, was forced to accept some arbitrariness with regard to how
he defined mathematical concepts such as cardinal number and ordered
pair. Once he has settled on particular definitions, however, there are no
further questions regarding identity claims holding between mathematical
objects: all such objects are extensions (or value-ranges more generally) and
so Basic Law V will settle the relevant identity in question. The neo-logicist,
on the other hand, in rejecting the recipe—and a single domain of primitive
objects generally—in favor of a multitude of distinct abstraction principles de-
scribing distinct (yet possibly overlapping) domains of mathematical objects,
44The name is a play on the familiar phrase “the Caesar problem”, and refers to the
specific case of determining whether the real numbers R generated by one abstraction
principle are identical to a sub-collection of the complex numbers C given by a distinct
abstraction principle. For a fuller discussion of this problem, see (Cook and Ebert, 2005)
and more recently (Mancosu, 2015).
45We do not mean to imply that settling whether two extensions in a non-well-founded
theory of extensions such as that found within Grundgesetze (or consistent sub fragments
of Grundgesetze is trivial, effective, etc. The point is merely that on Frege’s view the recipe
entails that there will be a straightforward fact of the matter that settles these identities.
Hence, regardless of whether determination of the status of cross-abstraction identities is
in-principle mathematically difficult, there are no deep philosophical puzzles here.
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suffers from no such arbitrariness. But the cost of avoiding the arbitrariness
found in Frege’s project is the C−R problem.46
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